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Rachel Cooper on classifying mental disorders and the DSM
Do you have a mental disorder? In many contexts, it depends on whether your behaviour meets
any of the sets of diagnostic criteria included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of MentalDisorders (DSM), a classiﬁcation of mental disorders, published by the American Psychiatric
Association, but used worldwide.
In May 2013, a new edition of the DSM (DSM-5) was published, and the domain of mental disorder
shifted. Here I will focus on one newly included disorder, hoarding disorder—a diagnosis for
people who compulsively hoard junk. Through considering hoarding, I will show how the question
of which conditions should be included in the DSM depends not only on empirical facts, but also
on conceptual and ethical questions.
Revising the DSM is a huge undertaking that involves many experts working for years. The
committees responsible published papers justifying the revisions that they made. In making a case
for hoarding to be included in the DSM, three hurdles had to be cleared—scientiﬁc, conceptual,
and ethical.
First, the scientiﬁc hurdle: The committee asked whether hoarding could be considered a distinct
condition. In particular, it weighed the evidence that hoarding can properly be considered a distinct
condition from obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). A number of studies suggested key
differences between hoarding and OCD. Patients experience the two conditions differently: while
obsessive thoughts are typically experienced as intrusive, thoughts associated with hoarding
normally ﬁt coherently with a patient’s other thoughts and values. There seem to be differences in
natural history: while hoarding typically gets worse over a life-time, OCD does not. Neuroimaging
studies suggest distinctions between hoarders and those with OCD. Treatment response may
differ in that people with OCD tend to be more responsive to certain drug therapies. Taken
together, there seems fair evidence that hoarding and OCD are distinct.
The paper then tackles the second, conceptual, hurdle—does hoarding ﬁt the deﬁnition of
disorder? The deﬁnition of mental disorder followed by the DSM requires that
[…] each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically signiﬁcant behavioral or
psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with
present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more
important areas of functioning) or with signiﬁcantly increased risk of suffering death, pain,
disability, or an important loss of freedom […] Whatever its original cause, it must currently be
considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the
individual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) nor conﬂicts that are
primarily between the individual and society are mental disorders unless the deviance or
conﬂict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual, as described above.
The review paper goes through the DSM deﬁnition point by point to see if hoarding can be made to
ﬁt. The issues of distress or impairment, and of clashes of values, are especially problematic.
Many hoarders deny that they have a problem; they may not see their hoard as junk, but as stuff
that they will one day use. Faced with such difﬁculties, the review authors decide to interpret
‘distress or impairment’ liberally. They conclude that the criterion is met as hoarding can pose a
health hazard and lead to conﬂicts with others. The reviewers see the conﬂict between hoarder
and society as being rooted in a problem in the hoarder: ‘given the evidence of associated
impairment and underlying disturbance, it seems clear that compulsive hoarding is not solely a
result of social deviance or conﬂicts with society’.
The ﬁnal hurdle that hoarding had to clear before being included in the DSM was ethical.
Guidelines for those revising the DSM demanded that proposers should consider whether ‘the
harm that arises from the adoption of the proposed diagnosis exceed[s] the beneﬁt that would
accrue to affected individuals’. Only revisions that on balance do no harm were to be accepted.
The reviewers brieﬂy discuss the potential harms and beneﬁts of including hoarding disorder in the
DSM. They conclude that on balance the new diagnosis can be helpful in that it will ‘likely increase
public awareness, improve identiﬁcation of cases, and stimulate both research and the
development of speciﬁc treatments for hoarding disorder’.
I have a number of interconnected concerns about the inclusion of hoarding disorder. First, let’s
remember that patterns of consumption and waste disposal have varied radically across place and
time, and differ between individuals. Susan Strasser’s (1999) Waste and Want: A Social History ofTrash shows that there is nothing that is unambiguously rubbish. Whether someone is ‘hoarding
junk’ is not a straightforwardly factual matter as ‘what is rubbish to some is useful or valuable to
others’. Strasser’s work also makes it clear that twenty-ﬁrst-century-style hoarding can occur only
within a very particular cultural niche. We live in cultures of plenty and consumption, where it is
common for much to be thrown away. In contrast, throughout history and in most places, most
people have had little and wasted less.
Still, although rubbish may be relative, and although hoarding has not always been possible,
shouldn’t we admit that those who ﬁll their houses from ﬂoor to ceiling with precarious piles of
newspapers and boxes have a mental health problem? I accept that the relationship between
hoarder and possessions is unusual, and also think that it is unwise to ﬁll one’s house with junk,
but I am still not entirely convinced that hoarding is best thought of as a mental disorder.
Remember, ﬁrst, that there are many habits and behaviours that are unwise but that we do not
pathologize. For example, many of us reduce our life expectancy by years because we fail to
exercise or to eat healthily. Others fail to back-up computer ﬁles, or to save adequately for old age.
Maybe hoarding differs from such examples of folly in that hoarding is more unusual, but rarity in
itself cannot transform a pattern of behaviour from a bad habit into a disorder.
Those who consider hoarding a disorder will likely point out that hoarding disorder is associated
with distinctive patterns of brain activity, and can be further distinguished from ‘normal behaviour’
by its natural history, treatment response, and the way in which it seems to run in families. But we
should note that none of these natural facts can clearly distinguish a disorder from a normal
(though in this case unwise) pattern of behaviour. Normal behaviours, for example playing music,
may also be accompanied by distinctive patterns of brain activity, can be affected by psychoactive
drugs, have a distinctive natural history, and run in families.
Whether hoarding should be considered a disorder must depend also on whether we consider it to
be the sort of problem that is appropriately dealt with by medical means, and here we should
pause. Medical treatment implicitly takes the root cause of a problem to be located ‘within’ an
individual, but problematic hoarding arises only in certain environments. Consider that one key
factor distinguishing those who meet the diagnostic criteria for hoarding disorder from sub-
threshold cases is that those who fail to meet the criteria ‘were more likely to live in larger
properties that had, on average, an additional room’.   Here we see that hoarding problems arise
relationally—the combination of individual characteristics, living situation, and broader material and
social environment, results in problems. It is plausibly the case that if hoarders were
psychologically different, they wouldn’t hoard. But equally, if they had bigger houses, there
wouldn’t be a hoarding problem either.
We should also worry about the fact that hoarders are said to often ‘lack insight’—that is, they
don’t think they have a problem, and they don’t want to be helped. Remember that new disorders
are supposed to be added to the DSM only if they are likely to do more good than harm. The
addition of hoarding disorder to the DSM will facilitate the diagnosis and treatment of those who do
not want to be diagnosed or treated. It is worth reminding ourselves that treating those who ‘lack
insight’ is generally a nasty business, and frequently involves tears and arguments. I am not
suggesting that all hoarders should be left alone. Certainly, it is true that sometimes an individual’s
possessions will need reining in by others. A vermin ridden or structurally unsound house must be
dealt with. But there are already laws for dealing with such problems. My worry is that in
medicalizing hoarding, the threshold for coercive intervention will become much lower. The risk is
that rather than intervention being thought justiﬁed only when the welfare of others is at risk, ‘help’
will be provided in much less severe cases for the hoarders ‘own good’.
It is easy to criticize, harder to make positive suggestions. If I think including hoarding disorder as
a new category in the DSM was a mistake, what would I have recommended instead? At present,
forms of cognitive behavioural therapy are amongst the most promising treatments being
developed for hoarding. For example, with colleagues, Randy Frost has developed a self-help
support group programme called the Buried in Treasures workshop. Hoarders meet with other
hoarders, discuss a chapter from the accompanying book, and complete weekly exercises dealing
with acquisition, discarding, and disorganization. Initial trials suggest the therapy is highly effective.
If Frost’s programme works, then this is great news. But there is no need to think of this as
‘therapy’; it could equally be framed as a structured and peer-supported programme for dealing
with a bad habit (rather like Weight Watchers). There is often no need to pathologize hoarding for
hoarders to be helped.
Finally, I should emphasize that although I think hoarding might often be better considered a bad
habit than a disorder, I do not think that this also applies across the board to other diagnoses
added to the DSM. Each condition added to the DSM is unique, and must be considered afresh.
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